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UNCONSTITUTIONAL HOSTING OF 
THE SUPER BOWL: ANTI-AMBUSH 
MARKETING CLEAN ZONES’ 
VIOLATION OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable 
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is 
practiced. . . . If there be time to expose through discussion 
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes 
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not 
enforced silence.  Only an emergency can justify repression.  
Such . . . is the command of the Constitution.  It is therefore 
always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free 
speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency 
justifying it.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The National Football League (NFL) is the premier sports entity in the 
United States.  Since the Super Bowl, the NFL’s championship game, began in 
1967,2 the now international spectacle has grown to new heights.  In 2011, 
Super Bowl XLV, between the Green Bay Packers and Pittsburgh Steelers, 
drew 111 million viewers nationwide, surpassing the 106.5 million viewers 
nationwide who tuned in to Super Bowl XLIV, which bested the previously 
most-watched program, the “M*A*S*H” series finale.3  Even more 
astounding is that the Super Bowl, as of 2009, is televised in 232 countries 
worldwide.4 
However, success breeds tension.  From 2005 through 2009, the top three 
 
1. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
2. Super Bowl History, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/superbowl/history (last visited Feb. 21, 
2011). 
3. Ben Klayman, Super Bowl Packs in Record U.S. TV Viewer Total, REUTERS.COM (Feb. 7, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/07/us-superbowl-ratings-idustre7163GS20110207. 
4. Superbowl XLIII and Superbowl Fun Facts, THENFLTHISWEEK (Feb. 1, 2009), http:/ 
/thenflthisweek.com/superbowl-xliii-and-superbowl-fun-facts/. 
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Super Bowl advertising spenders were all competitors of official NFL 
sponsors.5  The Super Bowl broadcasting rights-holder is permitted to sell the 
television commercial spaces to anyone willing to pay the enormous $3 
million rate for thirty seconds.6  Nonofficial sponsors view the Super Bowl as 
an opportunity to spotlight highly creative commercials to more than 111 
million people.  If the NFL required the Super Bowl broadcasting rights-
holder to sell advertising space only to official NFL sponsors, the broadcasting 
rights-holder would likely be paying millions less in rights fees because 
significantly fewer businesses would be permitted to buy advertising time; 
therefore, the supply would be greater, the demand lower, and advertising 
prices would drop proportionately from the approximately $3 million for a 
thirty-second commercial currently costs.7 
This Comment focuses mostly on the NFL’s conduct in protecting the 
Super Bowl and its own official sponsors from ambush marketing tactics.  
Sports entities, like the NFL, may have a contractual obligation to official 
sponsors to reasonably protect against ambush marketing.8  In fact, “[p]rudent 
sponsors negotiate contractual provisions that reduce the sponsorship fees 
payable in the event sponsorship rights are devalued.  Contractual provisions 
are also important for providing sponsors with the first option to become 
sponsors of the broadcast coverage and on other media, such as the official 
website.”9  Some sports entities find it necessary to educate the public about 
ambush marketing and how such ambushers can break the law, as the 
Federation of International Football Association (FIFA) does for the World 
Cup.10 
To curb nonsponsor activity on location at the Super Bowl, the NFL has 
seemingly decided to use a grassroots approach.  In its bid package sent to 
 
5. Most Super Bowl Viewers Tune in for the Commercials Nielsen Says, NIELSEN (Jan. 20, 2010), 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/press-room/2010/most_super_bowl_viewers.html (the top 
three advertisers were Bud Light, Budweiser, and Coca-Cola; their NFL official-sponsor competitors 
were Coors Light and Pepsi). 
6. Marketers Look to Super Bowl Pregame With In-Game Inventory Sold, SPORTS BUS. J. DAILY 
(Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2011/02/3/Marketing-and-
Sponsorship/SB-Ads.aspx. 
7. See Id. 
8. See SIMON GARDINER ET AL., SPORTS LAW 469 (3d ed. 2006). 
9. Id.; see Steve McKelvey & John Grady, Ambush Marketing: The Legal Battleground for Sport 
Marketers, 21 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 8, 14 (2004). 
10. See THE FIFA RIGHTS PROTECTION PROGRAMME AT THE 2010 FIFA WORLD CUP SOUTH 
AFRICA (2010). http://es.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/marketing/01/18/98/99/march2010 
rightsprotectio n_a5_20100308.pdf (educated the public by posting an informational brochure about 
the event’s rights and protection on the event website). 
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potential Super Bowl host cities, the NFL requires that the host city enact an 
ordinance prohibiting “temporary signs, inflatables and buildings wrapped 
with advertising banners” in an area covering a one mile radius around the 
stadium site during Super Bowl week.11  The NFL likely makes this a 
necessity for hosting a Super Bowl to prevent ambush marketing and preserve 
the value of its official sponsorships, among other reasons.  Furthermore, the 
NFL can legally make such a requirement without directly infringing on 
commercial speech freedoms by encouraging the host city to enact a 
temporary clean-zone ordinance prohibiting signage and advertising.12  
Although the NFL would likely argue that such clean-zone ordinances are for 
the purpose of furthering aesthetic and safety interests surrounding the Super 
Bowl,13 based on North Texas’ Bid Summary, it could be speculated that the 
main purpose and interest for enacting the clean-zone ordinances is to protect 
the Super Bowl and the NFL official sponsors against ambush marketing.14  
Super Bowl XLV seemingly went by without any issues or challenges as it 
related to the clean-zone ordinances in Arlington and Fort Worth, Texas—
except for some minor confusion as to how the ordinance would be enforced.15  
However, if a future Super Bowl host city enacts an ordinance that matches 
exactly what the NFL asks for in its bid package, as Fort Worth did, those 
cities should also be prepared for constitutional challenges to such clean-zone 
ordinances. 
This Comment will begin by exploring the meaning of ambush marketing, 
its relation to consumer confusion pursuant to the Lanham Act,16 and actual 
examples of its practice through case law.  Part II will provide an analysis of 
how legislators have acted to control the ambush marketing practice; both 
domestic and foreign legislation will be discussed.  Although the Lanham Act 
will likely not be a factor in determining the constitutionality of the clean-zone 
ordinances, the Act is necessary to understand how certain types of ambush 
marketing tactics are illegal in the United States.  Part III will review 
 
11. Arlington Addresses NFL’s Needs in 2011 Super Bowl Bid, SPORTS BUS. J.  DAILY (Apr. 13, 
2007), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/111100 (citation omitted).   
12. See ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 10-095 (2011) (repealed 2011); FORT WORTH, TEX., 
ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010 (2010) (repealed 2011).  
13. Telephone Interview with Dave Weinberg, Legal Counsel, NFL (Nov. 11, 2010). 
14. See Super Bowl Bid Summary, N. TEX. SUPER BOWL XLV HOST COMMITTEE 62–63 (2008), 
available at http://www.star-telegram.com/Multimedia/News/Super%20Bowl%20bid2.pdf 
[hereinafter North Texas Bid Summary]. 
15. Monika Diaz, Businesses Confused by Super Bowl ‘Clean Zones’, WFAA.COM, (Jan. 29, 
2011), http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/City-NFL-clean-zones-cause-confusion-for-business-owners 
-114845989.html. 
16. See generally Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2011). 
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municipal ordinances that have been upheld or struck down for violating the 
First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech.  Part IV will discuss the 
NFL’s policy requiring Super Bowl host cities to enact an anti-ambush 
marketing clean-zone ordinance as well as Fort Worth, Texas’ enacted (and 
now repealed) clean-zone ordinance.  Lastly, Part V will present a case for 
whether Super Bowl host city clean-zone ordinances may or may not infringe 
upon commercial freedoms of speech. 
II.  AMBUSH MARKETING AND CONSUMER CONFUSION 
Imagine that a business paid millions of dollars to be associated with a 
major sports entity and gained the full benefits of association, such as use of 
the entity’s name, likeness, and marks; signage rights and sampling 
opportunities at the entity’s major events; and many more similar benefits.  
Now imagine if the business’ major competitor put up signage and a tent 
outside the event’s facility to market its own products to consumers as they 
entered or walked around the facility.  This is just a minor example of how 
ambush marketing can take place in the sports industry. 
Ambush marketing occurs at every level of sport.  One of the earliest and 
most well-known ambush marketing tactics took place at the international 
level through the telecast of the Olympic Games.  Visa was the official credit 
card of the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Barcelona, Spain.17  American 
Express, “to counter Visa’s advertisement of its wide acceptance at the 
Olympics,” bought a considerable amount of commercial space on major 
television networks leading up to and during the Olympics.18  American 
Express did not use any symbol, logo, or word registered to the International 
Olympic Committee, but certainly suggested a competitive attitude against 
Visa—and an indirect association with the Olympic Games—by stating in its 
advertising, “In Spain, you won’t need a Visa.”19 
There are numerous ways to define ambush marketing, and no one 
definition is all-inclusive.  One way to explain the practice is when businesses 
advertise around a certain event, or organized professional or amateur sport or 
team, without paying rights fees to be an official sponsor and, therefore, be 
 
17. DOYICE J. COTTEN & JOHN T. WOLOHAN, LAW FOR RECREATION AND SPORT MANAGERS 
626 (5th ed. 2010); see also Edward Vassallo, et al., An International Look at Ambush Marketing, 95 
TRADEMARK REP. 1338, 1338 (2005) (explaining the same tactic used against Visa for the 1994 
Winter Olympics in Norway). 
18. Lori L. Bean, Note, Ambush Marketing: Sports Sponsorship Confusion and the Lanham Act, 
75 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1103 (1995). 
19. Id. at 1104. 
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officially associated with the sports entity.20  These businesses use ambush 
marketing tactics to unofficially associate themselves with the entity, 
potentially leading to a likelihood of consumer confusion and weakening of 
any official sponsorship’s value.21  Another definition is a company’s 
intention to “capitalize on the goodwill, reputation and popularity of a 
particular sport or event by creating an association without the authorization or 
consent of the necessary parties” and not an intention to directly weaken a 
competitor’s official sponsorship value.22  No matter how one defines it, 
ambush marketing is a prevalent concern that many sports entities must deal 
with to protect not only their own trademarks and goodwill, but their official 
sponsorship values as well. 
No matter how ambush marketing is defined, its practice has generally 
been upheld in courts, although there are exceptions.23  The Lanham Act has 
been commonly applied to ambush marketing cases because the most logical 
argument about ambush marketing is that it creates a likelihood of consumer 
confusion as to who is actually associated with the sports entity.24 
A.  The Lanham Act 
The Lanham Act provides sports entities with legal remedies from 
trademark infringement and misappropriation of goodwill.25  For example, the 
NFL might bring a claim under the Lanham Act if a nonofficial sponsor’s 
conduct creates a mistaken belief in consumers’ minds that the company is 
associated or endorsed by the NFL.  The Lanham Act’s primary purpose in 
regulating trademark law is to limit consumer confusion in the marketplace by 
punishing unfair competition and false advertising through unauthorized use of 
another’s marks.26  To be deemed liable under the Lanham Act, the claim’s 
 
20. See McKelvey & Grady, supra note 9, at 8–9. 
21. See id.; Anita M. Moorman & T. Christopher Greenwell, Consumer Attitudes of Deception 
and the Legality of Ambush Marketing Practices, 15 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 183, 184 (2005) 
(citations omitted); Bean, supra note 18, at 1100. 
22. McKelvey & Grady, supra note 9, at 9. 
23. See, e.g., NFL v. Gov. of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977). 
24. See, e.g., id.; see also NHL v. Pepsi-Cola Can., Ltd. (1992) 70 B.C.L.R. 2d 27 (Can. B.C. 
Sup. Ct.). 
25. Moorman & Greenwell, supra note 21, at 185. 
26. Id.; see generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2011); Bean, supra note 18, at 1110 (stating that  
The primary purposes of trademark law are to: (1) ‘identify one seller’s goods and 
distinguish them from goods sold by others[;]’ (2) signify that all goods bearing the 
trademark come from a single source and are of an equal level of quality; and (3) act as an 
instrument in the advertising and selling of goods.  Trademark law also protects the mark 
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proponent—likely a sports entity in sports-related ambush marketing cases—
must show that the defendant-ambusher was not authorized to use the 
proponent’s registered mark(s),27 and that the unauthorized use created a 
likelihood of consumer confusion.28  If there is no agreement between the 
parties allowing the defendant ambusher to use the plaintiff entity’s 
trademarks (e.g. logos, name), then it is likely that the defendant ambusher 
was not authorized to use the plaintiff entity’s marks.  Likelihood of confusion 
is shown by a possibility of a public misconception that the mark’s owner 
approved the ambusher’s use of the entity’s trademark; however, no actual 
confusion is required to find the defendant ambusher liable under the Act.29 
A sports entity, like the NFL, which believes its sponsorship rights have 
been exploited by ambush marketing tactics may look to the Lanham Act 
when seeking remedies.30  The issue with applying the Lanham Act to ambush 
marketers is that smart and successful ambushers will likely not use the 
entity’s exact logo or other registered mark.31  The Lanham Act is not likely to 
protect a business entity mark when ambushers either do not use the mark or 
merely use a comparable mark or reference in their advertising.32  For 
example, when a nonofficial sponsor creates a sweepstakes in December and 
January for consumers to win tickets to “the Big Game,” consumers know it is 
referring to the Super Bowl without the nonofficial sponsor actually using a 
NFL mark. 
For example, in 1976, the State of Delaware began a lottery program 
where lottery purchasers could bet each week on NFL games.33  There were 
three different lottery games available throughout the season, and their basic 
purpose was for lottery players to pick at least three teams to win each week; 
the participant would win if he picked all the correct winners.34  In addition to 
 
as an objective symbol of a business’ good will.);  
Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A 
Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1992) (stating that the Lanham Act’s 
purpose is to prevent competitors from deceiving consumers who act on the false advertising) 
(citations omitted). 
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). 
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
29. Dall. Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204–05 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
30. Moorman & Greenwell, supra note 21, at 185. 
31. See id. at 186. 
32. Id. 
33. NFL, 435 F. Supp. at 1375–76. 
34. Id. at 1376. 
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other claims, the NFL argued that Delaware violated the Lanham Act by using 
the NFL schedule to create a lottery game, and benefited from such conduct 
while infringing on the NFL’s trademark rights.35  The court held that because 
the lottery tickets did not use any NFL team nickname or any other NFL 
registered mark, the fact that the lottery used only the team’s city name did not 
“constitute infringement of [the NFL’s] registered marks or unfair 
competition.”36 
Alternatively, the court held that a business may not advertise its products 
in such a manner that would create confusion in the consumer’s mind that the 
product is somehow associated with, or endorsed by, the registered mark-
holder when no association or endorsement actually exists.37  The court held 
that the Delaware Lottery violated the Lanham Act due to a showing by the 
NFL that a substantial percentage of the NFL audience in Delaware was 
actually, or was likely to be, confused about whether the Delaware Lottery 
was officially associated with or endorsed by the NFL.38  The court ruled that 
one-fifth of the survey participants constituted substantial confusion because 
21% of NFL fans “either said that, as far as they knew, the legalized betting on 
professional football was arranged by the State with the authorization of the 
teams or said that it was conducted by the teams alone.”39  After finding 
substantial confusion amongst consumers, the court required the Delaware 
Lottery to put a prominent and clear disclaimer on every lottery ticket, and in 
all advertising, that the lottery program was in no way associated with or 
authorized by the NFL.40  Unfortunately for the NFL, this remedy was not as 
severe as it argued for; the NFL wanted the court to grant a full injunction on 
the entire lottery program as it related to the NFL games.41 
National Football League v. Governor of the State of Delaware illustrates 
that businesses may benefit and profit from the NFL’s popularity without, at 
least in this case, arising to misappropriation.42  The business must merely 
provide a clear and prominent disclaimer that states the business and product 
are not affiliated with or sponsored by the NFL, as other courts have ruled.43  
 
35. Id. at 1380. 
36. Id. 
37. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2011). 
38. NFL, 435 F. Supp. at 1380–81. 
39. Id. at 1381. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 1376–77. 
42. Id. at 1378. 
43. Id. at 1381; see McKelvey & Grady, supra note 9, at 11–13; see generally NHL v. Pepsi-
Cola Can., Ltd. (1992) 70 B.C.L.R. 2d 27 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.). 
SLIFFMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2012  10:01 AM 
264 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:1 
 
Based on this holding, it could be inferred that a business may use ambush 
marketing tactics in any way or manner it wishes so long as it does not use the 
entity’s registered marks and does use a disclaimer stating it is not endorsed or 
connected to the entity in any way. 
B. Event-Specific Legislation 
A common trend in sports today is for sport entities to place a requirement 
on the local governments hosting the event to enact legislation to protect the 
entity’s marks and the value of its official sponsorships, causing the 
suppression of commercial speech.44  It has been argued that even though such 
requirements impede on what is supposed to be free commercial speech—at 
least in the United States—politicians have never actually put up a fight 
against sports entities in enacting the requirements.45  While this Comment is 
focused on the NFL’s clean-zone requirement, it is necessary to discuss the 
oldest surviving international sporting event first. 
More than any other sporting event, the Olympic Games (Games) are 
supposed to be the most pure.  There are no sponsor logos or signage inside 
event facilities; the only corporate marks seen on the athletes while competing 
are the actual apparel companies’ logo, but even the logo’s size is limited.46  
Even more cherished than the “purity” and aesthetics of the Games are the 
Olympic marks.  More than any other entity, courts throughout the world have 
ruled against ambush marketers in false advertising and consumer confusion 
cases when Olympic marks are involved.47  This is because national 
legislatures have enacted laws strictly protecting the use of Olympic marks 
and advertising that purport to imply an association or connection to the 
Games.48 
1.  United States: Ted Stevens Amateur Sports Act49 
The Ted Stevens Amateur Sports Act (ASA) “grants the United States 
Olympic Committee (USOC) an almost absolute right to control the use of any 
 
44. John Grady et al., From Beijing 2008 to London 2012: Examining Event-Specific Olympic 
Legislation Vis à Vis the Rights and Interests of Stakeholders, 3 J. SPONSORSHIP 1, 1 (2010). 
45. Id. at 6–7. 
46. Chris Isidore, Olympics’ No-Name Sponsors, CNNMONEY (Feb. 15, 2002), http://money.cnn. 
com/2002/02/15/olympics/olympics_sponsors/. 
47. See infra, the discussion of domestic and foreign legislation and application. 
48. See infra, the discussion of domestic and foreign legislation. 
49. See generally Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220529 
(2011). 
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Olympic-related words, marks, mottos or insignia by others.”50  The ASA 
does not require the USOC to show any likelihood of confusion—as required 
by the Lanham Act—to make a successful infringement case as to the 
Olympic symbols.51  The ASA grants exclusive right to the USOC to the five 
interlocking rings symbol and the word “Olympic” itself.52  Furthermore, the 
ASA permits the USOC to authorize sponsors and other such contributors of 
goods and services to use the protected marks in its advertising to illustrate 
that it is a sponsor or contributor to the USOC.53  Although the act does not 
explicitly reference ambush marketing as a purpose of what it intends to 
prohibit, it can certainly be implied.54 
The USOC may bring a civil action against an alleged violator of the ASA 
“if the person, without the consent of the [USOC], uses [the Olympic marks or 
words] for the purpose of trade, to induce the sale of any goods or services, or 
to promote any theatrical exhibition, athletic performance, or competition.”55  
The subsection also provides the same remedy for any advertising by a 
business that gives a false representation of association with or endorsement of 
the Games themselves,56 which seemingly protects the USOC and its sponsors 
from the most obvious ambush marketing tactics. 
However, one caveat to the ASA is the marks’ use must be for commercial 
purposes or to promote athletic competition.57  When deciding whether speech 
is commercial, a court will discuss three factors in making its determination: 
(1) whether the speech is an advertisement; (2) whether the speech references 
a specific product; and (3) whether the speech is motivated by an economic 
interest.58  In short, the main question is whether the speech suggests a 
commercial transaction.59  In United States Olympic Committee v. American 
Media, Inc., the United States District Court of Colorado ruled that, although 
 
50. Vassallo et al., supra note 17, at 1350; see, e.g., U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Intelicense Corp., 
737 F.2d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that the ASA’s legislative intent is “to promote the United 
States Olympic effort by entrusting the USOC with unfettered control over the commercial use of 
Olympic-related designations.”). 
51. 36 U.S.C. § 220506(c) (2011); see also Vassallo et al., supra note 17, at 1350. 
52. § 220506(a)(2), (4). 
53. § 220506(b). 
54. Vassallo, et al., supra note 17, at 1350. 
55. § 220506(c). 
56. § 220506(c)(4). 
57. See generally S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987); U.S. 
Olympic Comm. v. Am. Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Colo. 2001). 
58. Am. Media, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 1207 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 
60, 66–67 (1983)).  
59. Id. 
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the defendant used the word “Olympic” in its magazine titled Olympics USA, 
the USOC failed to state a claim under the ASA upon which relief could be 
granted because the court found that American Media (AMI) was not using the 
word “Olympics” for a commercial purpose.60  The USOC argued that AMI 
allegedly used Olympic marks and words covered under the ASA “‘for the 
purpose of trade and to induce the sale of [its magazine],’ and to ‘pass off 
OLYMPICS USA as if it were authorized by the USOC’” in a way intended to 
confuse Olympic consumers.61  More specifically, the USOC alleged that 
AMI, without permission, used illustrations of Olympic medals, the Olympic 
torch, and other such Olympic-related symbols for the purpose of selling its 
magazine.62  Furthermore—and more related to ambush marketing—the 
USOC asserted “that AMI’s unauthorized use of its marks will encourage 
‘other companies that are not Olympic sponsors/suppliers/licensees . . . to 
use . . . [Olympic] marks and terminology without entering into a sponsorship, 
suppliership, or other licensing agreement[s]’” and “will ‘likely impair the 
USOC’s relationships with its existing and prospective sponsors, suppliers, 
and other licensees.’”63 
The court, however, agreed with AMI that it did not violate the ASA by 
publishing Olympic-related content in its magazine64 because the title itself 
was not commercial speech.65  The court also relied on AMI’s disclaimer—as 
the court in Delaware required on the state’s lottery tickets—because it stated 
the magazine was not affiliated or licensed by the USOC or the Olympic 
Games.66  However, it could be argued that the title was commercial speech 
because the title of a magazine or book certainly has an effect on whether one 
buys the magazine, especially when the magazine is so closely related to an 
event such as the Olympics.  The ASA is one example of how the United 
States protects the Olympic properties from ambush marketing tactics to 
protect the branding and marks of the USOC and the Games; other countries 
 
60. Id. at 1202. 
61. Id. at 1203 (citation omitted). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 1203–04. 
64. Id. at 1210. 
65. Id. at 1209. 
66. Id. at 1203 n.3; but see, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 522 (holding that a non-
profit organization could not use the word “Olympic” in its event called the “Gay Olympic Games” 
because the use of the phrase “Olympic Games” related to athletic participation).  For further insight 
on use of trademarks subject to the ASA, see Erinn M. Batcha, Comment, Who Are the Real 
Competitors in the Olympic Games? Dual Olympic Battles: Trademark Infringement and Ambush 
Marketing Harm Corporate Sponsors – Violations Against the USOC and its Corporate Sponsors, 8 
SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 229, 231 (1998). 
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around the world have also enacted similar—and more stringent—statutes to 
not only protect the Olympic marks, but other major international events as 
well. 
2.  Foreign Legislation Protecting Against Ambush Marketing 
Three years prior to the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver, the 
Canadian Senate enacted the Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act (Bill C-
47).67  The Act’s purpose, similar to the Lanham Act and the ASA, was to 
prohibit companies from using “an Olympic or Paralympic mark or a mark 
that so nearly resembles an Olympic or Paralympic mark” where it is likely to 
cause confusion.68  Furthermore, Bill C-47 also implied that no company shall 
mislead and confuse the public into believing that the company was approved 
and authorized by any organizing committee, including Canada’s, to use the 
mark or in some way be officially associated with a specific organizing 
committee or the Games itself.69 
Other countries have enacted similar legislation for the Olympic Games as 
well: China (Regulations on the Protection of Olympic Symbols),70 Greece 
(Protection of the Olympic Symbol),71 Italy (Turin Olympics Act),72 and 
Australia (Sydney 2000 Games Protection Act 1996).73 
However, the Olympic Games are not the only international spectacle 
“ripe” for ambush marketers to profit off the event’s goodwill.  One could 
argue that the FIFA World Cup is certainly equal to, if not more popular than, 
the Olympics.  Easily the strictest laws of all, South Africa originally used the 
Trade Practices Act74 (TPA) and Merchandise Marks Act75 (MMA) in 
 
67. Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act, S.C. 2007, c. 25, § 3 (Can.); Nancy A. Miller, Ambush 
Marketing and the 2010 Vancouver-Whistler Olympic Games: A Prospective View, 22 INTELL. PROP. 
J. 75, 82 (2009). 
68. Miller, supra note 67, at 87. 
69. See S.C. 2007, c. 25, § 4(1). 
70. See Anne M. Wall, Intellectual Property Protection in China: Enforcing Trademark Rights, 
17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 341, 367–68 (2006); see also Grady et al., supra note 44, at 4. 
71. See PHILLIP JOHNSON, AMBUSH MARKETING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE 
BRAND OF A SPORTING EVENT 122 (2008) (citing Law 2598/1998 Organisation of the Olympic 
Games–Athens 2004, Art. 3).  
72. Id. (citing Law of August 17, 2005 No.167, Art. 1(2) (measures for the protection of the 
Olympic symbol in relation to the Turin 2006 Olympics)). 
73. Id. at 122–23; see also Vassallo, et al., supra note 17, at 1350–51 (distinguishing the Sydney 
Games Act from the ASA—in addition to the Olympics’ mottos and trademarks, it included vague 
use such as “Sydney 2000” and “Summer Games” as well as “‘any visual or aural representations 
that, to a reasonable person, . . . would suggest a connection’ with the Sydney 2000 Games.”). 
74. Vassallo, et al., supra note 17, at 1349 (citing Trade Practices Act 76 of 1976, s. 52–53). 
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association with the 2003 Cricket World Cup, but the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
and its official sponsors were its most recent beneficiaries.76  The laws make 
ambush marketing a criminal offense, resulting in large fines and lengthy jail 
time for violators during protected events such as the FIFA World Cup.77  The 
TPA, like the Lanham Act, prohibits “publication or display of false or 
misleading statements or ads implying a contractual or other connection with a 
sponsored event . . . .”78  The MMA prohibits intentional use of a trademark in 
association with an event when the perpetrator has not received consent from 
the event organizer.79  Furthermore, the mark must be used in a way where the 
perpetrator received a free unofficial association with the event.80 
The TPA was first applied to “ambushers” of the 2003 Cricket World 
Cup.81  Two teachers took students, who had Coca-Cola in their lunches, to a 
cricket match—Pepsi was the event’s official sponsor.82  Event officials would 
not permit the students’ “entry until they peeled off the Coca-Cola labels and 
scraped off the logos from all the bottle tops and lids.”83  Security’s conduct 
makes one wonder what the event officials’ goals were in this situation 
because it would have made more sense to have the students merely throw out 
the Coca-Colas, similar to many other sport facilities and events that prohibit 
attendees from bringing in soda. 
Ambush marketing is a constant threat to the protection of sports entities’ 
marks and brands, as well as the value of its official sponsorships.  The NFL, 
by recommending that Super Bowl host cities enact clean-zone ordinances, has 
devised its own way to protect the aesthetic feel and branding of the Super 
Bowl in addition to protecting its official sponsorship values; however, 
commercial speech protection under the First Amendment must be discussed 
to determine whether the NFL’s recommendation is actually constitutional. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND THEIR AFFECT ON 
BUSINESS BRANDING AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Successful branding is one of the most vital business practices a 
 
75. Merchandise Marks Act 17 of 1941, § 15A (S. Afr.). 
76. Vassallo, et al., supra note 17, at 1348–50. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 1349. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. (citation omitted). 
83. Id. 
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company—or even an individual—can use to create a flourishing business or 
career.  Everyone is a brand, individuals and businesses alike, constantly 
branding himself in perpetuity.  Successful branding is not merely saying the 
right words at the right time and place, it is also advertising to the best 
consumer market to buy what one sells, not misleading consumers, creating a 
strong consumer base that has knowledge that one’s product exists, building a 
reputation for quality, having others stand behind and advocate for one’s 
product, and, most importantly, not having others demean the brand 
unlawfully through false association or otherwise.  The most popular way to 
brand a business is through advertising, which is the act of promoting a 
product, service, or event by giving notice of it to a public medium.84  Many 
businesses advertise in newspapers, on television and radio, but also—and 
more relevant here—through signage and vending in public space.  Through 
commercial free speech, businesses advocate for themselves, advertising their 
brand to others.  However, such commercial speech is not always permitted by 
law or protected by the First Amendment. 
A.  Constitutional Regulation of Branding: Commercial Speech 
Courts have historically treated commercial speech restrictions much 
differently than restrictions on noncommercial speech.85  However, 
commercially communicative activity, such as advertising, is protected by the 
First Amendment in most circumstances.86  There has generally been a 
disagreement among the courts about what commercial speech is.  The 
Supreme Court has suggested that commercial speech is not easily definable 
but still described it as any communication that tends to propose a commercial 
transaction or, similarly, “expression related solely to the economic interests 
of the speaker and its audience.”87  Protection of commercial speech is based 
on the First Amendment’s protection of the right to disseminate information.88  
 
84. Definition of Advertisement, OXFORD DICTIONARY, available at http://oxforddictionaries. 
com/view/entry/m_en_us1220116 (last visited Feb. 22, 2011). 
85. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 
562–63 (1980). 
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Darrel C. Menthe, Reconciling Speech and Structural 
Elements in Sign Regulation, 44 GONZ. L. REV. 283, 287 (2009). 
87. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).   
88. Kerri L. Keller, Note, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly: The Supreme Court Sends First 
Amendment Guarantees Up in Smoke by Applying the Commercial Speech Doctrine to Content-Based 
Regulations, 36 AKRON L. REV. 133, 142 (2002); see Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 
(describing advertising as the “dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what 
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However, to have protection under the First Amendment, advertising is strictly 
limited to truthful, nonmisleading communication.89  Furthermore, the fact 
that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment only if it is both 
truthful and nonmisleading fits squarely within the Lanham Act, which 
prohibits a business from misleading or misrepresenting its products to 
consumers and creating a likelihood of confusion that may result in false 
advertisement.90  Additionally, when state law is at issue, the First 
Amendment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and, 
therefore, protects commercial speech from unconstitutional governmental 
restrictions.91 
When an ordinance’s purpose is to restrict commercial speech, courts have 
generally favored the government’s exercise of its police power, which 
strengthens the legality of subjecting signage or vending in the public medium 
to municipal regulations and weakens commercial speech’s protection by the 
First Amendment.92  Nevertheless, there are occasions when an ordinance will 
not be favored, generally due to a lack of legitimate governmental interests 
that are directly furthered by suppressing such commercial speech. 
1.  The Commercial Speech Doctrine 
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York, the state government enacted an ordinance prohibiting all 
advertising promoting the use of electricity in New York State.93  The 
Supreme Court held that, although the Constitution does not protect 
commercial speech to the extent of other forms of expression, the protection 
available for commercial speech depends on whether the speech itself is legal, 
as well as the governmental interests furthered by the regulation.94  To 
determine whether the regulation unconstitutionally infringed upon the 
plaintiff’s commercial speech rights as protected by the First Amendment, the 
Court created what is now known as the Commercial Speech Doctrine, or the 
Central Hudson test.95 
 
product, for what reason, and at what price . . . [and to] this end, the free flow of commercial 
information is indispensible.”).  
89. Keller, supra note 88, at 142; see Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.  
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2011). 
91. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761–62.  
92. Menthe, supra note 86, at 283. 
93. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 558. 
94. Id. at 562–63.  
95. Id. 
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Under the test, the commercial speech must neither mislead the public nor 
be related to an illegal activity.96  The Court’s intent was to permit 
government prohibition of communication that was “more likely to deceive 
the public than to inform it,”97 which is a similar purpose—as related to 
ambush marketing—for the Lanham Act.  If the commercial speech at issue 
meets the nonmisleading and legal activity standard, it may be subject to First 
Amendment protection.98  The next determination is whether the government 
asserts a legitimate interest for suppressing commercial speech.99  Lastly, as 
the First Amendment demands, any restriction on speech must directly 
advance the asserted legitimate governmental interest and be narrowly tailored 
to achieve the asserted interests.100  Otherwise, the excessive restriction cannot 
survive.101 
2.  Legitimate Governmental Interests for Clean-Zone Ordinances 
The most common legitimate interests likely to be applied to a Super Bowl 
host city’s clean-zone ordinance are community aesthetics and safety.102  
Aesthetics lend to the quality of the city’s appearance due to the absence of 
clutter or excessive off-site commercial signage, which has consistently been 
found a legitimate governmental interest.  A municipality’s desire to have a 
clean-looking presence is within its police power, so long as such restriction 
does not have an ulterior motive in restricting commercial speech.103  
Community safety, whether related to traffic or otherwise, is a common sense 
legitimate governmental interest.  The Supreme Court held that billboards and 
signs are intended and designed to avert a person’s concentration, regardless 
of whether he is driving, walking, or biking, and therefore, considering 
 
96. Id. at 563–64, 566.  
97. Id. at 563 (citation omitted). 
98. Id. at 566.  
99. Id. at 564, 566. 
100. Id. at 565.  
101. Id. at 564.  
102. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 493 (1981) (stating that the 
government’s legitimate interests in its ordinance prohibiting all off-site outdoor advertising signs 
were health and safety as well as aesthetics); San Francisco v. Eller Outdoor Adver., 237 Cal. Rptr. 
815, 817 (Ct. App. 1987) (stating that, in banning all off-site commercial advertising, regardless of 
content, the city’s legitimate interests were safety and aesthetics).  
103. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510 (claiming that because “[a]esthetic judgments are necessarily 
subjective, defying objective evaluation, [such restrictions] must be carefully scrutinized to determine 
if they are only a public rationalization of an impermissible purpose.”). 
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billboards as safety hazards is reasonable.104  Furthermore, courts have ruled 
that aesthetics, as well as traffic safety, are legitimate governmental interests 
after Congress passed the Federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965,105 
which prohibits states from having billboards viewable from certain federally-
funded highways.106  Although such legitimate governmental interests facially 
pass the third element of the Central Hudson test, the regulations must be 
uniformly applied.  However, courts have permitted a difference in treatment 
under First Amendment protections based on the distinction between on-site 
and off-site commercial speech. 
3.  On-Site vs. Off-Site Commercial Branding 
Many courts, including the Supreme Court, have ruled that there is a legal 
distinction between on-site and off-site commercial advertising, even though 
both may be equally hazardous to safety and equally unappealing to the eye.107  
On-site signage includes advertising the business conducted, or the services or 
products sold, on the premises.108  Conversely, off-site signs are those that are 
not located on the premises for which the sign advertises.109 
In Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, San Diego enacted an ordinance 
that prohibited all off-site outdoor advertising signs.110  The plaintiff brought 
suit to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance pursuant to the First and 
 
104. Id. at 508–09.  
105. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (2011).  
106. § 131(a) (stating that the purpose for such legislation is “to protect the public investment in 
such highways, to promote the safety and recreational value of public travel, and to preserve natural 
beauty.”); see Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510, n.16. 
107. Id. at 511 (citing Suffolk Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808 (1978); Markham 
Adver. Co. v. Washington, 393 U.S. 316 (1969); and Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 440 U.S. 901 
(1979)). 
108. Id. at 493–94; Eller Outdoor Adver., 237 Cal. Rptr. at 819  n.5; see also Menthe, supra note 
86, at 312. 
109. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 493–94. 
110. Id. at 494–95 (stating that although the ordinance prohibited off-site signage, it did provide 
exemptions for most non-commercial signage, including  
government signs; signs located at public bus stops; signs manufactured, transported, or 
stored within the city, if not used for advertising purposes; commemorative historical 
plaques; religious symbols; . . . for sale and for lease signs; signs on public and 
commercial vehicles; signs depicting time, temperature, and news; . . . and ‘temporary 
political campaign signs.’   
Fort Worth, Texas also has a similar prohibition on off-site signage.  See  FORT WORTH, TEX., 
ORDINANCE NO. 17872-11-2007, § 1, Art. 4(6.405(1)) (2007)). 
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Fourteenth Amendments.111  Applying the Central Hudson test, the Court 
found (1) the commercial advertising at issue did not involve illegal activity or 
mislead its audience—plaintiff sold outdoor advertising112—and (2) the city’s 
interests in traffic safety and aesthetics were legitimate governmental 
interests.113  Next, the Court held (3) there was a direct correlation between 
traffic safety and billboards,114 and that there was also a direct correlation 
between advancing the city’s aesthetic interests and regulating signage.115  
Lastly, the Court held (4) the ordinance was not broader than necessary 
because billboards can create traffic hazards and unsightliness.116  Therefore, 
the most direct and effective way to resolve such issues was to completely ban 
them.117 
An important distinction is made in Metromedia between on-site and off-
site commercial advertising—although both are similarly disruptive to safety 
and aesthetics.  The Court upheld the City’s interest in protecting on-site 
commercial advertising over off-site commercial advertising because 
businesses, as well as the interested public, have stronger interests in 
identifying places “of business and advertising the products or services 
available there than it has in using or leasing its available space for the 
purpose of advertising commercial [businesses] located elsewhere.”118  In 
conclusion, the Court found off-site commercial advertising may be prohibited 
although on-site commercial advertising is permitted.119 
4.  Permits and Licensing 
This final subsection dealing with commercial branding relates to the 
requirement of permits or licenses to allow commercial speech in regulated 
areas.  Although the NFL’s bid package does not, on its face, recommend the 
 
111. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 498. 
112. Id. at 507. 
113. Id. at 507–08. 
114. Id. at 509. 
115. Id. at 510. 
116. Id. at 508. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 512. 
119. Although the court found nothing constitutionally invalid with the ordinance as it related to 
commercial speech, it did rule the ordinance unconstitutional because it impermissibly afforded 
commercial speech more protection than non-commercial speech, which has been held to violate 
constitutional law.  Id. at 512–14.  This may become a factor in deciding whether the NFL-related 
clean-zone ordinances are constitutional as applied to non-commercial law, but this Comment is more 
concerned with commercial advertising by nonofficial sponsors. 
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city to require permits for temporary signage, subject to approval, the bid 
package does recommend that the ordinance give the NFL the unbridled 
discretion to approve or deny requests for such temporary signage otherwise 
prohibited under the clean-zone ordinance.120  Such a provision providing 
unbridled discretion to a private-sector company in the public forum will and 
should be found unconstitutional.  
In Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. City of Atlanta Department of 
Aviation,121 the Eleventh Circuit struck down an ordinance because a “grant of 
unrestrained discretion to an official responsible for monitoring and regulating 
First Amendment activities is facially unconstitutional.”122  In preparation for 
hosting the 1996 Olympic Games, Atlanta’s Department of Aviation 
(Department) required all vendors to obtain a permit and pay a permit fee in 
association with selling their products.123  The ordinance prohibited 
newspaper companies from using their own newsracks, requiring the 
companies to use the city’s newsracks instead.  The ordinance was not a 
regulation of commercial speech—as most ordinances discussed in this 
Comment are—but a discriminatory regulation of speech based upon its 
content.  The Department had an agreement for an advertising deal with Coca-
Cola to have its logos and advertising on the newsracks inside the airport.124  
Virtually any other advertising on such newsracks was prohibited.125  
However, the constitutional question was whether a Department official may 
be granted full and unbridled discretion to determine whether to grant approval 
for a permit.126  The court held that the person charged with approving 
requests for permits must have clear and objective standards in determining 
such a request.127  Absent those standards, the official’s use of unbridled 
discretion would violate First Amendment protections.128 
The Ninth Circuit, in Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Moreno 
 
120. North Texas Bid Summary, supra note 14, at 63. 
121. See generally 322 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2003). 
122. Id. at 1310 (emphasis omitted); see also Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 
750, 755, 764 (1988); Desert Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 
1996).  For a more general discussion on the unbridled discretion of permit requirements, see Menthe, 
supra note 86, at 314–18. 
123. Atlanta Journal & Constitution, 322 F.3d at 1304.  
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 1310–11. 
127. Id. at 1311. 
128. Id. 
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Valley,129 took the “unbridled discretion” rule one step further.  It ruled that, 
although there were some standards for issuing a permit—”whether a 
particular . . . sign will be harmful to the community’s health, welfare, or 
‘aesthetic quality’”—city officials may not have the discretion to deny a 
permit for ambiguous and subjective reasons.130  Therefore, an ordinance must 
have specific and unambiguous criteria for determining whether a permit 
request shall be approved or denied. 
Furthermore, Desert Outdoor also provided a standing requirement for 
bringing a claim against an allegedly unconstitutional permit ordinance for 
posting signage.  There must be (1) an injury-in-fact, where the claimant has 
an actual and well-evidenced showing that the ordinance will be enforced 
against him, (2) the injury must be caused by the ordinance’s enactment, and 
(3) the injury can be remedied by a favorable decision.131  Furthermore, a 
claimant may still have standing even if that party failed to apply for a permit 
when applying for such a permit would have been useless.132  The Ninth 
Circuit ruled that the claimant’s application for a permit would have been 
useless because “the ordinance flatly prohibited [the] appellants’ off-site 
signs” located inside the regulated zones.133   
Thus, if the Super Bowl host cities enact exactly what the NFL 
recommends—that all off-site commercial-speech-related activity within the 
clean zones is subject to NFL approval—those clean-zone ordinances should 
be found unconstitutional under the First Amendment because the ordinance 
would grant the NFL, a private entity, unbridled discretion to approve what 
businesses may speak through advertising.  
IV.  CLEAN-ZONE REGULATIONS 
As discussed in Part II, ambush marketing has different meanings to 
different individuals.  An event organizer might believe that ambush 
marketing is morally incorrect and should be an unfair business practice.  
However, one successful ambush marketer believes that ambush marketing is 
“ethically and legally correct since official sponsors only buy the official 
association with a particular event such as the Olympics or World Cup rather 
than the entire thematic space surrounding the event.”134  One legal academic 
 
129. See generally 103 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 1996). 
130. Id. at 818–19. 
131. Id. at 818. 
132. Id. (citation omitted). 
133. Id. 
134. Moorman & Greenwell, supra note 21, at 184 (emphasis added).  Jerry Welsh, the ambush 
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simplifies this by stating that “one cannot sell what one does not own, and no 
sport organization owns the entire concept of or aura surrounding a sport such 
as . . . football . . . .”135  However, the NFL—the most popular United States 
sports league136—has been given such power to control who can advertise in 
and around the city during Super Bowl Week and, therefore, does own the 
local concept and aura that surrounds football’s championship game. 
To prevent ambush marketing, sports leagues in the United States are 
extremely protective of the value of their official sponsorships.  For example, 
the National Basketball Association (NBA) requires its All-Star Game host 
cities to enact a temporary ordinance during NBA All-Star Week to prevent 
ambush marketing.137  In 2009, Arlington, Texas temporarily amended its 
already existing legislation to accommodate the NBA’s requirement for an 
anti-ambush marketing ordinance during the NBA All-Star Week.138  The 
ordinance was enforced for eleven days, banning “temporary signs, tent sales, 
projected image signs, inflatables and other marketing activities in an area 
around the stadium if [the company has] no official ties to the All-Star 
Game.”139  The NFL quickly followed suit at the same venue, requiring 
Arlington, as well as Fort Worth, to enact a similar anti-ambush marketing 
clean-zone ordinance for Super Bowl XLV at Cowboys Stadium in February 
2011.140 
A. NFL Super Bowl Bid Package 
The bid request package sent to all cities interested in hosting the Super 
Bowl requires the host committee to work together with the local government 
to create anti-ambush marketing “clean zones.”141  These clean zones 
encompass a one-mile radius around the event’s facility as well as “on the 
property of area airports, within a 6-block radiu[s] of the NFL Headquarters 
 
marketer referenced in the text, created American Express’ advertising campaign that ambushed the 
Olympics by implying an association with the Games in the 1990s.  Id. 
135. Id. (emphasis added). 
136. See generally MLS Sees 12-Month High in Popularity Among Avid Sports Fans, SPORTS 
BUS. J. DAILY (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/142491.  
137. Susan Schrock, Arlington to Consider Advertising Rules to Protect NBA All-Star Game 
Sponsors from Rivals, STAR-TELEGRAM.COM (Fort Worth, Tex.) (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.star-
telegram.com/2009/11/29/1798287/arlington-to-consider-advertising.html. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Arlington Addresses NFL’s Needs in 2011 Super Bowl Bid, supra note 11. 
141. See North Texas Bid Summary, supra note 14, at 62–63. 
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Hotel and around the location of NFL Experience.”142 
More specifically, the clean zones must include the following: 
1. Temporary Structures – A prohibition against temporary 
structures, including but not limited to temporary retail 
locations not approved in writing by the NFL. 
2. Temporary Sales Permits—No temporary sales permits may 
be granted within the clean zone during Super Bowl week[.] 
3. Temporary signage- A prohibition against temporary 
signage or banners, video screens, electronic message boards, 
or nighttime projections of commercial messages during 
Super Bowl week. 
4. Inflatables- A prohibition against the installation or display 
of inflatables. 
5. Building Wraps- A prohibition against existing buildings 
temporarily wrapped with advertising banners or signage 
(except for even-related [sic] signage approved by the NFL). 
6. Preventive Fund- If such prohibitions cannot be obtained, 
the Host Committee must provide a fund of one million 
dollars ($1000000) for the NFL to use to prevent ambush 
marketing.143 
Furthermore, North Texas’ Bid Summary states that the City of Arlington, 
as it did with the NBA All-Star Week,144 “adopted (without controversy) a 
series of anti-ambush marketing ordinances in effect for events at the 
Stadium.”145  The host committee also agreed to work with the municipal 
jurisdictions to support the secondary clean zones at the area airports and for 
the NFL Experience, including the City of Fort Worth.146 
Fort Worth, which housed both Super Bowl teams and attractions such as 
the NFL Experience and ESPN’s Super Bowl coverage, enacted a clean-zone 
ordinance that followed the NFL’s recommendations precisely.147  The biggest 
difference between Arlington’s clean-zone ordinance and Fort Worth’s is that 
 
142. Id. at 63. 
143. Id. 
144. See Schrock, supra note 137. 
145. North Texas Bid Summary, supra note 14, at 114 n.11. 
146. Id. at 114 n.11, 115. 
147. See generally FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010 (2010) (repealed 2011). 
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Arlington’s did not permit any temporary commercial speech,148 while Fort 
Worth’s ordinance subjected application for temporary commercial speech to 
the approval of the NFL’s sole-discretion.149 
B.  Fort Worth’s Clean-Zone Ordinance 
Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance was enacted on January 23, 2011, 
effective until 12:01 AM on February 8, 2011, the night after the Super 
Bowl.150  The ordinance first set out that the NFL “owns, produces and 
controls the annual professional football championship game known as the 
‘Super Bowl.’”151  Then, the ordinance provided that the purpose for hosting 
the Super Bowl in North Texas is to “create substantial beneficial economic 
and fiscal activity.”152  As host of the NFL Experience, the NFL Super Bowl 
headquarters, and the American Football Conference (AFC) champions, it was 
Fort Worth’s goal, by enacting the clean-zone ordinance, to protect the city’s 
festive image beginning fourteen days before the Super Bowl.153 
Fort Worth found it necessary to enact the ordinance because the NFL 
informed city officials that difficulties have ensued in Super Bowl host cities 
where there was no regulation of “temporary outdoor advertising displays 
visible from public streets or sidewalk[s] in the vicinity of Super Bowl related 
events result[ing] in pedestrian and vehicular traffic” safety issues.154  The 
safety concern is increased because of the large gatherings of people who enter 
the clean-zone area.155  Finally, the last purpose for enacting the ordinance 
was to “promote and protect good order and aesthetic quality and to protect the 
safety and convenience of drivers and pedestrians in and around downtown 
during the Super Bowl XLV and its related Super Bowl activities.”156  This 
language set out aesthetics and public safety as likely legitimate governmental 
interests that would be furthered by suppressing otherwise legal commercial 
speech. 
Section One describes the geographical area that constitutes the clean zone 
 
148. See generally ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 10-095 (2011) (repealed 2011). 
149. See FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010. §§ 1(1)–(2), (6)–(7), 2(4). 
150. Id. § 1. 
151. Id. § 1. 
152. Id. § 5. 
153. Id. §§ 6, 8. 
154. Id. § 9. 
155. Id. § 10. 
156. Id. § 12. 
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and the activities prohibited within that zone.157  The ordinance prohibits the 
following if visible from any public street, property, or sidewalk, unless 
approved by the NFL: (1) any “Outdoor Event,” (2) any temporary structure, 
unless it is adjacent to the host’s place of business and used for a private party 
of less than 500 people, and (3) any “[o]utdoor advertising displays, including, 
but not limited to, portable signs, flags, streamers, pennants, banners, 
decorative flags, video screens, balloons, electronic message boards, nighttime 
projections of commercial messages, inflatables and building wraps.”158  
However, restaurant A-frame and window signs are permitted under the 
ordinance.159 
Although Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance specifically stated that its 
governmental interests were public safety and aesthetics, the fact that the 
phrase “unless approved by the NFL” appears throughout the ordinance 
suggests otherwise.  Specifically, the NFL used its influence so that during the 
two weeks prior to the Super Bowl, other non-legitimate interests—such as 
preventing otherwise legal ambush marketing—were met in addition to the 
legitimate aesthetic and public safety interests. 
V.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FORT WORTH’S CLEAN-ZONE ORDINANCE 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE SUPER BOWL HOST CITIES 
Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance, on its face, is unconstitutional.  
Applying the Central Hudson and Metromedia standards, a court may hold 
that aesthetics should not be a legitimate governmental interest because Fort 
Worth clearly had an ulterior motive—bowing to the demands of the NFL to 
secure the Super Bowl for the North Texas area.  Furthermore, the clean-zone 
ordinance provides the NFL with unbridled discretion to determine what 
businesses may use outdoor advertising.  This is in direct conflict with Atlanta 
Journal & Constitution.  To avoid or defeat a constitutional challenge, future 
Super Bowl host cities should not include the language “unless approved by 
the NFL” within an enacted clean-zone ordinance. 
A.  Fort Worth’s Clean-Zone Ordinance: An Argument Against 
Constitutionality 
This subsection will apply the Central Hudson, Metromedia, and Atlanta 
Journal doctrines to evince that Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance is facially 
 
157. Id. § 1. 
158. Id. §§ 1(1)–(2), (6). 
159. Id. § 1(6). 
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unconstitutional.  Assume that a restaurant owner brought a constitutional 
challenge against the ordinance prior to Super Bowl XLV.  The restaurant was 
within the clean zone, but the owner was going to temporarily advertise—
using legal and nonmisleading commercial speech—on-site and outdoors.  The 
advertising promoted a beer that was not the official beer sponsor of the NFL 
but was a product sold at the restaurant.  Furthermore, the beer advertising was 
visible from the public street. 
Under the Central Hudson test, Fort Worth would have to assert legitimate 
governmental interests for restricting the restaurant’s commercial speech.  
According to Fort Worth’s Frequently Asked Questions About Clean and 
Buffer Zones, the zones were not only “created to protect public health, 
welfare and safety,” but to also protect against ambush marketing and selling 
tactics during Super Bowl week.160  The interest Fort Worth has in relation to 
protecting against ambush marketing tactics during Super Bowl week would 
likely be the economic value of having the Super Bowl in North Texas. 
In both the Fort Worth and Arlington clean-zone ordinances, one of the 
goals of, and interests in, hosting the Super Bowl was to “create substantial 
beneficial economic and fiscal activity.”161  If the North Texas Bid Committee 
failed to promise the NFL that Arlington and Fort Worth would enact clean-
zone ordinances, one could assume that the NFL would look to other cities for 
hosting the Super Bowl because the NFL’s interests in having an aesthetically-
pleasing, safe,162 and ambush-free event would not be met.  Therefore, both 
Arlington and Fort Worth would not meet their own interest in creating 
substantial economic and fiscal activity; courts have previously held that 
economic vitality is a legitimate governmental interest.163 
Aesthetics are usually a legitimate governmental interest—advanced here 
by limiting what advertising, vending, and events may occur on public 
property or within the view from public streets—because a city’s desire to 
have a clean-looking presence, especially when hosting a worldwide event 
such as the Super Bowl, is within a city’s police power.164  However, 
aesthetics may not be found to be a legitimate governmental interest when 
 
160. Frequently Asked Questions About Clean and Buffer Zones, CITY FORT WORTH, 
http://www.fortworthgov.org/uploadedFiles/Super_Bowl_Clean_Zone.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) 
[hereinafter Fort Worth FAQ]. 
161. FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010 § 5; ARLINGTON, TEX., ORDINANCE 
NO. 10-095, § 8 (2011) (repealed 2011). 
162. Telephone Interview with Dave Weinberg, supra note 13. 
163. See Roulette v. Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1447 (W.D. Wash. 1994). 
164. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510. 
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there is an ulterior motive for having such an ordinance.165  As the Court in 
Metromedia proclaimed, “[a]esthetic judgments are necessarily subjective, 
defying objective evaluation, and [therefore, such restrictions] must be 
carefully scrutinized to determine if they are only a public rationalization of an 
impermissible purpose.”166  It could be successfully argued that Fort Worth 
had an ulterior motive in enacting its clean-zone ordinance.  Fort Worth 
effectively gave the NFL monopoly power over the clean-zone area to benefit 
the NFL’s value for its official sponsors and to protect those sponsors from 
ambush marketing.  This was boldly evident in the North Texas Bid 
Summary167 and in Fort Worth’s published frequently asked questions 
document available on its website.168 Both state that in addition to protecting 
aesthetics and public safety, the ordinances were also created to protect the 
downtown area from ambush marketing tactics.169 
Such ambush marketing tactics would be used not only to capitalize on the 
NFL’s goodwill and reputation, but also to clutter the market space.  These 
tactics would inevitably make the NFL’s official sponsorships less valuable.  
According to the ordinance, the NFL may grant approval to anyone it desires 
to have off-site and outdoor temporary signage within the clean zone.170  
Therefore, because the ordinance permits the NFL, in its sole discretion, to 
prohibit commercial speech, aesthetics may not be utilized as a legitimate 
governmental interest.  However, this discussion does not base its argument 
solely upon this issue.  Even assuming arguendo that aesthetics would be 
found as a valid governmental interest, the ordinance may still be 
unconstitutional. 
The third part of the Central Hudson test is to determine whether the 
clean-zone ordinance directly furthers the legitimate governmental interests.  
First, the potential economic vitality interest is not furthered by the clean-zone 
ordinance.  On its face, the ordinance permits the NFL to grant permission to 
itself or to any of its official sponsors to host outdoor events, place temporary 
structures, have outdoor temporary signage, or allow temporary vending that is 
“visible from any public street, public property or sidewalk.”171  Allowing the 
NFL such a unilateral power may still directly further Fort Worth’s legitimate 
 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. North Texas Bid Summary, supra note 14, at 62–63. 
168. Fort Worth FAQ, supra note 160. 
169. Id.; North Texas Bid Summary, supra note 14, at 62–63. 
170. FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010, § 1(6) (2010) (repealed 2011). 
171. See Id. §§ 1(1)–(2), (6)–(7). 
SLIFFMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2012  10:01 AM 
282 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:1 
 
interests in aesthetics and public safety because the ordinance would still work 
to limit all other commercial speech. 
However, it can be argued that, on its face, the ordinance restricts 
economic vitality rather than advances it.  Prohibiting a restaurant located 
within the designated clean zone from placing on-site and outdoor advertising 
of its products facing the public street may hinder the restaurant’s business.  It 
would effectively be prohibited from having outdoor advertising promoting 
any of the NFL nonofficial sponsor’s beer specials it may have during Super 
Bowl week, or that it even sells the product on location.  Fort Worth might 
argue that the ordinance’s purpose, as related to economic vitality, is to grow 
the future prosperity of the city as a whole, and businesses should not merely 
look at the short-term; however, hosting the Super Bowl generally has no 
actual economic effect on the host city.172  Additionally, any economic vitality 
interest would not be furthered by enacting the clean-zone ordinance, but only 
by hosting the Super Bowl.  Therefore, economic vitality is likely not a 
legitimate governmental interest advanced by the clean-zone ordinance. 
Furthermore, an argument exists that aesthetics is not furthered directly by 
the clean-zone ordinance either.  The ordinance allows the NFL, or whoever 
the NFL allows, to place temporary off-site signage and vending in and around 
the clean zone.  There is no limit within the ordinance preventing the NFL 
from allowing only a certain number of off-site temporary signage; therefore, 
it is certainly plausible that the NFL could grant approval to its partners and 
sponsors for more signage and vending than would have otherwise been if no 
approval was needed.  Although plausible, this argument will likely not 
succeed because an ordinance meant to directly further aesthetics does not 
have to eliminate clutter or excessive off-site signage, but must merely limit 
it.173  Alternatively, a court may still strike down the ordinance on the basis of 
the Central Hudson test due to the public’s value placed on on-site signage. 
The Central Hudson test requires a determination of whether Fort Worth’s 
clean-zone ordinance is narrowly tailored to further its potential legitimate 
interests in aesthetics and public safety.  Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance 
may not be narrowly tailored because the NFL may facially prohibit, in its sole 
discretion, the restaurant’s on-site outdoor advertising of products available, 
which would otherwise be permissible.174  As the ordinance suggests, any 
 
172. See Darren Rovell, What Is a Super Bowl Worth? Good Question, ESPN (Feb. 2, 2006), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs05/news/story?id=2315303. 
173. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511–12. 
174. See Diaz, supra note 15.  The West End Pub’s owner was informed by police that he had to 
take down Bud Light signage he had on his property that was outside on his property but faced the 
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signage that is visible from the public street or sidewalk is not permitted, 
unless approved by the NFL.  Furthermore, the ordinance grants the NFL 
approval rights for temporary off-site signage, which Metromedia clearly 
prohibits because greater value is given to on-site signage than off-site signage 
and consumers have a material interest in knowing what products the 
restaurant sells,175 which the ordinance facially prohibits.  Therefore, the 
ordinance may be constitutionally overbroad because it facially prohibits 
businesses from certain on-site advertising of their products while allowing the 
NFL to grant approval for off-site advertising to its official sponsors.176  The 
ordinance would not have been overbroad had it merely prohibited all 
temporary commercial speech, as the Arlington ordinance did. 
Apart from the Central Hudson test, there are specific provisions in the 
Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance that make the ordinance facially 
unconstitutional as well.  The ordinance permits the NFL, a private entity, to 
use unbridled discretion to favor its official sponsors over nonofficial sponsor 
companies.  The ordinance grants the NFL the power to allow its official 
sponsors to place outdoor temporary advertising in public areas.177  However, 
the ordinance also facially provides the NFL with unbridled discretion to 
prohibit companies not officially affiliated from temporarily advertising.  As 
the Eleventh Circuit ruled in Atlanta Journal & Constitution, a government 
may not place complete and unbridled discretion in a government official.178  
A logical argument flowing from such a holding is that a government would 
therefore be prohibited from placing such unbridled discretion in a private 
entity like the NFL.  Therefore, Fort Worth’s clean-zone ordinance is, on its 
face, unconstitutional. 
However, because the ordinance has a severability clause, which states 
that if any provision in the ordinance is found unconstitutional, only the 
unconstitutional provision shall be removed from the ordinance, and the 
remaining constitutional provisions will remain intact.179  Removing the 
“unless approved by the NFL” language would leave Fort Worth’s ordinance 
nearly identical to Arlington’s.  Arlington’s ordinance appears to treat all off-
site commercial speech identically and does not give any public official or 
private entity unbridled discretion to approve what would otherwise be 
 
public street. Id. 
175. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511–12. 
176. See Diaz, supra note 15. 
177. See FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010, § 1(6) (2010) (repealed 2011). 
178. Atlanta Journal & Constitution, 322 F.3d at 1310. 
179. FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 19492-12-2010, § 6. 
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prohibited under the clean-zone ordinance and is, therefore, facially 
constitutional. 
B.  Recommendations for Future Super Bowl Clean-Zone Ordinances 
In the future, the NFL should not include its “unless approved by the 
NFL” language in its bid package requirements.  The NFL wants to protect its 
official sponsorships’ values and provide its sponsors with a completely 
protected platform at the Super Bowl to activate their sponsorships and 
improve their brands’ recognition.  However, it should not put host cities, 
which advance the massive amounts of money to host the NFL’s mega-event, 
in the position of enacting an unconstitutional ordinance in order to do so.  For 
the Super Bowl clean-zone ordinances to be constitutional, the NFL will have 
to “deal with” eliminating all off-site commercial speech from the cities 
hosting future Super Bowls, and not merely the commercial branding and 
advertising of whomever the NFL disapproves. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
All sports entities go to enormous lengths in protecting themselves and 
their official sponsors from ambush marketing and selling tactics.  Some have 
brought suit under the Lanham Act for an ambusher allegedly profiting from 
the entity’s goodwill and reputation, while other entities have persuaded and 
lobbied local governments to enact legislative regulations restricting such 
ambush marketing tactics.  Additionally, many countries have enacted 
legislation on a national level to prohibit ambush marketing during worldwide 
events like the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games.  However, in the 
United States, legislatures should be mindful to enact an ordinance that that 
will be upheld against a constitutional challenge. 
The NFL should not be blamed for flexing its muscle and 
“recommending” that host bid cities promise to enact a clean-zone ordinance 
during the Super Bowl.  The NFL has valid and substantial business interests 
in aesthetics and public safety at the Super Bowl as well as protecting the 
value of its official sponsorships.  Companies pay millions of dollars every 
year to be officially associated with the United States’ most popular 
professional sports league, and the NFL should flex its muscles to prevent any 
ambush marketing tactics from occurring where it could potentially hinder the 
value of its official sponsorships or take away from the aura surrounding its 
championship game.  Allowing such conduct may certainly be detrimental to 
one’s brand, and companies may think even harder about whether the 
investment is actually worth the price. 
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Event organizers must always be cognizant of ambush marketing tactics.  
The official sponsors will certainly question whether the sponsorship is 
actually worth what they paid if the ambush marketers can profit off the event 
without paying the official sponsorship fees.  However, as an event organizer, 
there is only so much one can do to prevent such ambush marketing tactics.  
The NFL, as evidenced by the Fort Worth clean-zone ordinance, essentially 
owned the entire concept of, and aura surrounding,180 the Super Bowl’s 
festivities area by having approval rights for who could temporarily advertise 
in the public space.  In Arlington, the NFL was still protected from most 
ambush marketing tactics; however, it could not implement its own marketing 
tactics as it could in Fort Worth.  The NFL, like most sport entities, has taken 
on the responsibility to keep official sponsorship values protected.  However, 
it should use all constitutional means to support its sponsors regarding clean-
zone requirements, rather than conducting itself in a manner that may subject 
the Super Bowl’s host to constitutional challenge. 
Ari J. Sliffman 
 
180. Moorman & Greenwell, supra note 21, at 184. 
